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Debriefing the President: The Interrogation of Saddam
Hussein. By John Nixon. New York: Penguin Random House,
Blue Rider Press, 2016. ISBN: 978-0-399-57581-5. Pp. iv, 242,
$25.00.
John Nixon was an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for
thirteen years. He earned B.A. and an M.A. in History and an M.A. in National
Security Studies. When he joined the CIA, he studied and analyzed Iran and
Iraq and delved deeply into CIA files about then Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein
to become a subject matter expert. When U.S. forces captured Saddam
Hussein, Nixon was his debriefer, spending weeks at close quarters with the
former dictator. Nixon is a gifted writer and he employs his academic and
analytic skills well in telling his story. The book is captivatingly easy to read
and flows like a novel.
Nixon describes his early experiences at the CIA, where he worked for a
number of risk-averse bureaucrats who did not think strategically. He derides
the rampant cronyism as a factor that stifles intellectually honest debate
about what the intelligence gathered really means. He speaks of his
frustration that the CIA’s lack of resources on the ground in Iraq before the
war hampered its ability to perform meaningful analysis.
Based on his experiences with Saddam Hussein, Nixon posits that the United
States underestimated what it was getting into in Iraq, and certainly did not
understand the Iraqi dictator, misreading him on multiple levels. He relates
that Saddam viewed Sunni extremism as a threat and thought that the U.S.
would ally with him to combat it. Saddam feared Wahhabism and Iranian
adventurism and thought his interests and those of Washington were
compatible.
Nixon states that had the U.S. left Saddam Hussein in power, the so-called
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) would have never come into being.
Saddam’s removal created a power vacuum that created the conditions
leading to a vicious sectarian bloodbath. Nixon repeatedly outlines how the
U.S. did not understand before the invasion of Iraq the potential
consequences of removing Saddam Hussein from power. This was due in part
to a lack of insight on how Saddam viewed the world from inside his insular
bubble, and the actual political and sectarian elements in Iraqi society. Nixon
observes that Saddam studied and was fascinated by history, but lacked the
intellect to learn its lessons. Saddam was instead focused on internal security
(maintaining his grip on power) and his leisure pursuits (Saddam fancied
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himself a writer and had penned a novel). According to Nixon, Saddam was
more concerned with writing fiction than governing (or ruling) Iraq.
As he got to know Saddam, Nixon came to understand that Saddam’s
protective detail, some 4,500 operatives strong, was layered, redundant, and
all in the family. Saddam believed that family was the best insurance against
betrayal. Nixon was aghast to find that when the U.S. invaded Iraq, Saddam
had no escape plan. Viewed in this light, Saddam’s lack of an escape plan
explains why the U.S. did not know where to look for him. He sought refuge
with trusted relatives and friends, moving about frequently. Nixon states that
Saddam was loyal to those who showed him loyalty.
From his sessions with Saddam, the author notes that Saddam was highly
suspicious of everyone, charismatic, tough, shrewd, and manipulative in an
attempt to control whatever situation in which he found himself (including
his debriefing sessions). Nixon recounts that he was surprised and somewhat
dismayed that the U.S. Government had never prepared to capture Saddam
alive. He outlines how the guidance on debriefing Saddam changed often as
the attorneys zig-zagged their way across the legal landscape with conflicting
directives. He expresses his frustration that there was no plan to debrief
Saddam – he was told to just do it.
Nixon shares that Saddam understood Iraq holistically but had no grasp on
international relations. A narcissist, Saddam viewed himself as a great leader
and everyone else as his inferior. When asked a question he did not want to
answer, Saddam feigned ignorance, asking Nixon to refresh his memory to see
what Nixon knew. Saddam’s style of leadership was ad lib; he did not discuss,
analyze, seek consensus from, or collaborate with, his senior leaders.
As their sessions went on, Saddam acknowledged to Nixon that he could have
done more to create a clear picture of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) program to the U.S. When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, Saddam
was surprised. He had no plan to combat the U.S. and did not understand
military doctrine.
In the final chapters of the book, Nixon gives his unvarnished view of the CIA,
how analysis is employed, and former President George W. Bush. Nixon
posits the CIA should tell the President what he needs to know rather than let
the White House tell the CIA what interests it – the “service” approach.
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“As the conflict with Iraq loomed, the service approach became even
more entrenched. It can work wonders if the policymaker is steeped in
the issues, knows which questions to ask, and is brave enough to make
decisions regardless of their political impact. But the service approach
can have disastrous results when the president has strong
preconceptions, a short attention span, and little time until the next
election. I always felt that deciding what was important should be the
job of the analysts, because policymakers are often too busy to know
what they should be focusing on….In effect, we provided intel fixes
without telling policymakers where an issue was headed or what
outcomes to expect” (188-9).
Nixon exhibits great disappointment in his assessment that President Bush
did not understand Saddam and misread who he was and what he did what he
did. He then writes that President Bush and Saddam were similar in multiple
ways:
“Both had haughty, imperious demeanors. Both were fairly ignorant of
the outside world and had rarely traveled abroad. Both tended to see
things as black and white, good and bad, or for and against, and
became uncomfortable when presented with multiple alternatives.
Both surrounded themselves with compliant advisors and had little
tolerance for dissent. Both prized unanimity, at least when it
coalesced behind their own views. Both distrusted expert opinion”
(207).
Nixon’s recounting of Saddam and his observations rightly belong in any
leadership study of dictators and international strong men. His view of
President Bush does not hold back any punches and borders on the derisive.
He rails against how business is done in Washington and calls for a change in
the way analysis is done and used. It seems ironic that a historian who
laments how policymakers have failed to learn from history does not himself
see how he has not learned how business is done in Washington.
Mark Roberts, Subject Matter Expert
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